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Abstract
In this paper, we consider social status, the spirit of capitalism, "scal policies, and asset
pricing in a stochastic model of growth. With speci"c assumptions on the production
technology, preferences, and stochastic shocks, we derive the explicit solutions to the
growth rates of consumption and savings and equilibrium returns on all assets. We
further demonstrate how "scal policies, the spirit of capitalism, and stochastic shocks
a!ect growth, asset pricing, and welfare.  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights
reserved.
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1. Introduction
In neoclassical growth models wealth accumulation is often taken to be solely
driven by one's desire to increase consumption rewards. The representative
0165-1889/02/$-see front matter  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S0 1 65 -1 88 9 (0 0 ) 00 0 43 - 9agent chooses a consumption path to maximize his discounted utility, which is
de"ned only on consumption. This motive is important for wealth accumula-
tion. It is, however, not the only motive. Because man is a social animal, he also
accumulates wealth to gain prestige, social status, and power in the society; see
Frank (1985), Cole et al. (1992, 1995), Fershtman and Weiss (1993), Zou (1994,
1995), Bakshi and Chen (1996), and Fershtman et al. (1996). Earlier contribu-
tions include Duesenberry (1948), Kurz (1968), and Spence (1974). In these
wealth-is-status models, the representative agent has direct preferences for
wealth and accumulates wealth not only for consumption but also for wealth-
induced status. Mathematically, in light of the new perspective, the utility
function can be de"ned on both consumption, c, and wealth, =: u(c,=).
Another interpretation of these models is in line with the spirit of capitalism in
the sense of Weber (1958) and Keynes (1971): capitalists accumulate wealth for
the sake of wealth. To cite Weber (1958):
Man is dominated by making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of
his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the
satisfaction of his material needs. This reversal relationship, so irrational from
a naive point of view, is evidently a leading principle of capitalism.
Using the wealth-is-status and the-spirit-of-capitalism models, many authors
have tried to explain growth, savings, and asset pricing. Cole et al. (1992) have
demonstrated how the presence of social status leads to multiple equilibria in
long-run growth. Zou (1994, 1995) has studied the spirit of capitalism and
long-run growth and showed that a strong capitalist spirit can lead to un-
bounded growth of consumption and capital even under the neoclassical as-
sumption of production technology. Bakshi and Chen (1996) have explored
empirically the relationship between the spirit of capitalism and stock market
pricing and o!ered an attempt towards the resolution of the equity premium
puzzle in Mehra and Prescott (1985). They have shown that when investors care
about status they will be more conservative in risk taking and more frugal in
consumption spending. Furthermore, stock prices tend to be more volatile with
the presence of the spirit of capitalism.
On the other hand, Eaton (1981), Turnovsky (1993, 1995), Grinols and
Turnovsky (1993, 1994), and Obstfeld (1994) have introduced stochastic tax and
stochastic government expenditure into the continuous-time growth and asset-
pricing models. Under speci"c assumptions on the production technology,
preferences, and stochastic shocks, they have derived explicit solutions to the
growth rates of consumptionand savings and equilibrium returns on assets. But
these continuous-time stochastic growth models have not explicitly considered
the role of social status and the spirit of capitalism in capital accumulation,asset
pricing, and growth.
In this paper, we integrate these two trends of growth and asset-pricing
literature and consider social status, "scal policies, and asset pricing in
a stochastic model of growth. With speci"c assumptions on the production
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to the growth rates of consumption and savings and equilibrium returns on all
assets. We further demonstrate how "scal policies, social status, the spirit of
capitalism, and stochastic shocks a!ect economic growth and asset pricing.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present a modi"ed growth
and asset-pricing framework as in Turnovsky (1995) and Bakshi and Chen
(1996). In Section 3, we derive the optimal conditions for macroeconomic
equilibrium. In Section 4, using a speci"c utility function, we present explicit
solutions to the consumption}wealth ratio, the mean growth rate of the econ-
omy, and the expected real return on bonds and capital. In Section 5, we discuss
the e!ects of stochastic shocks and "scal policies on the economy. In Section 6,
wediscuss the e!ects of the concernfor social status or the spirit of capitalismon
asset pricing and growth. We conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. The model
Along with Eaton (1981) and Turnovsky (1995), we assume output > and
government expenditure G to be proportional to the mean-level output, i.e.
d>"Kdt#Kdy, (1)
dG"gKdt#Kdz. (2)
Eq. (1) asserts that the accumulated #ow of output over the period (t,t#dt),
given by the right-hand side of this equation, consists of two components. The
deterministiccomponentis described as the "rst term on the righthand, which is
the "rm's production technology and has been speci"ed as a linear production
function. The second part is the stochastic component, which can be viewed as
the shock to the production and assumed to be temporally independent, nor-
mally distributed, and
E(dy)"0, Var(dy)"  dt.
In Eq. (2), thedeterministicpart of governmentexpenditureis expressed interms
of a fraction of mean output, and government expenditure has the stochastic
shock dz. It is further assumed that dz is temporally independent, normally
distributed, and
E(dz)"0, Var(dz)"  dt.
Following Turnovsky (1995), it is assumed that there are two assets in the
economy: government bonds, B, and the capital stock, K. If the in#ation rate is
stochastic as in Fischer (1975), the return on government bonds B will also
follow a stochastic process. Without providing much detail on the derivations,it
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bonds, dR, over a period dt, is given by
dR"r dt#du, (3)
where r and du will be determined endogenously in the macroeconomic
equilibrium.
Turning to the second asset, capital, and using the production technology in





Thus, wealth =(t) is the sum of the holdings of B(t) and K(t), i.e.,
=(t)"B(t)#K(t).









Wemay assumethat, withoutanyloss ofgenerality,taxes areleviedoncapital
income and consumption, namely,
d¹"(rK#c)dt#Kdu"(K#c)dt#Kdy, (5)
where , are the tax rates on the deterministic component of capital income
and the stochastic capital income, respectively, and  is the tax rate on
consumption. The introduction of a consumption tax into the model is new. As
shown later, consumption tax impacts on economic growth in the wealth-is-
status or the spirit-of-capitalism model. In the traditional setup with the utility
de"ned only on consumption, a consumption tax has no long-run e!ect on
growth and wealth accumulation, it only crowds out private consumption.
Now, the representative agent chooses the consumption}wealth ratio, c/=,
and the portfolio shares, n and n, to maximize his expected utility subject to
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given by B(0) and K(0), respectively. In addition,
dw"n du#n(1!)du. (8)
The inclusion of total wealth as an argument in the utility function has been
done in many deterministic models mentioned in our introductory section,
and its presence in a stochastic model appears only in Bakshi and Chen (1996)
in the context of stock-market pricing. But recently Turnovsky (1995),
Grinols (1996), and Grinols and Turnovsky (1996) have included real balances
(or liquidity services), which are a component of wealth, in the utility function in
their studies of "scal and especially monetary policies in stochastic models.
Since we will consider a real economy here, real balances are not in the
picture. It is natural to extend the model to a monetary economy and take real
balances as a part of total wealth. This is clearly a direction for further research.
It will be interesting to compare the results obtained here with the ones
with money.
3. Macroeconomic equilibrium
As in Turnovsky (1995), the economic system in equilibrium determines the
rates of consumption and savings, the value of returns on all assets, and the
economic growth rate.
The exogenous variables include the preference parameters, technology para-
meters, and government "scal policies including government expenditure g, tax
rates , , and . The exogenous stochastic processes consist of government
expenditure, dz, and productivity shocks, dy, which are taken to be mutually
uncorrelated. The remaining stochastic disturbances * real rates of returns on
bonds, du, and total wealth, dw, are both endogenous and will be determined
by the economic system. The remaining endogenous variables include the
following: the consumption}wealth ratio, c/=, the mean growth rate of the
economy, the expected real returns on two assets, r, and r, respectively, and
the corresponding portfolio shares n and n.





subject to (6) and (7).
De"ne
<(=,t)"eX(=,t).








where  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the portfolio selection con-











where "nr#n(1!)r, and it is the expected net-of-tax return on total
asset holdings.
See the details of the proof in Appendix A.
Condition (9) asserts that in the equilibrium the marginal utility of consump-
tion must equal the marginal utility of wealth; conditions (10) and (11) are the
asset pricing relationships; condition (12) is the portfolio selection constraint;
and Eq. (13) is the Bellman equation, from whichwe will solve the value function
X(=,t).
In order to determine the full equilibrium system, we follow Turnovsky (1995)
in discussing government behavior. Eqs. (2) and (5) describe government expen-
diture policy and tax policies, both of which are proportional to current output.
In the absence of lump-sum taxation, government budget constraint can be
described as
dB"BdR#dG!d¹. (14)






























For the equilibrium in the product market, we have
dK"d>!cdt!dG, (16)
where G follows the stochastic process of Eq. (2). Now, we have














and the transversality condition (TVC) plus the initial conditions.
Furthermore,
Proposition 3.3. The stochastic component of real rate of return on bonds,d u, and
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From the equationsabove, and noticing the fact n#n"1, it is easy to get dw
and du. 
These two equations enable us to compute all the necessary covariances and
variances in the full equilibrium system. Eq. (19) implies that the stochastic
shocks of government expenditure and production determine the stochastic rate
of return on government bonds.
4. An explicit example






where 	'0, and 
50 when 	51, and 
(0 otherwise; 
 measures the
investor's concern with his social status or measures his spirit of capitalism. The
larger the parameter 
, the stronger the agent's spirit of capitalism or concern
for social status.
Under the form of the utility function in (21), we have
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"nr#n(1!)r, (22)
dw"n du#n(1!)du, (23)
 	"n  #n (1!) #2nn(1!). (24)
Eq. (9) gives the consumption}wealth ratio. For a logarithmic utility
function in consumption, i.e., 	"1, we get c/=": the consumption}wealth
ratio is equal to the time discount rate. If 	O1, then the e!ect of an








Therefore,an increase in the expectednet-of-taxreturn  will raisethe consump-
tion}wealth ratio if 	'1, and lower it otherwise. This can be explained as
follows. When 	'1, the elasticity of intertemporalsubstitution, 1/	, is relatively
small. The representative agent will increase current consumption more than
investment and wealth. On the other hand, when 	(1, the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution is relatively large, and the agent will increase wealth
holding more than consumption.









Therefore, an increase in the variance of wealth reduces the consump-
tion}wealth ratio when 	(1, and increases the ratio when 	'1.
Eqs. (10) and (11) illustrate the asset pricing relationships. The term of
/(1!	!
)= can be regarded as &risk-free' return in this all risky world
* both returns on bonds and capital are uncertain. Eq. (10) implies that the
return on bonds is equal to the &risk-free' return plus a risk premium, which is
proportional to the covariance between total wealth and risky bonds. Similarly,
in Eq. (11), for the net return on the risky capital,it is also equal to the &risk-free'
return plus a risk premium, which is proportional to the covariance between
total wealth and risky capital.
Since  is still endogenous in terms of holding shares for the two assets, we
now use the full equilibrium system to derive explicit solutions to c/=, n, n,
r, and . With Proposition 3.3, and from the optimal conditions (10) and (11)
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The "rst term on the right-hand side of Eq. (25) is the net (after-tax) return on
capital, which is the same as in Turnovsky (1995); the second term on the
right-hand side is the stochastic component of the return on bonds.
With Proposition 4.2, we now have our main theorem of this section:












































Using Eqs. (25), (26), and the portfolio-selection constraint n#n"1, we
have Eq. (30). 
Please also note that the transversality condition (31) can be shown to be

























Eq. (32) is just the condition for a positive consumption}wealth ratio.
5. Comparative dynamics
Now, we discuss how stochastic shocks (in production and government
spending) and government "scal policies a!ect the equilibrium.
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Therefore, when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is relatively small,
a higher variance in government expenditure increases the consumption}wealth
ratio, whereas the stochastic shock in production lowers the consumption}
wealth ratio.















From Eq. (28), the equilibrium growth rate, , varies with the stochastic









)'0. Therefore, more volatility in government spending always
increases the rate of economic growth. This is true because an increase in
  raises the risk of bonds. The agent reduces his holding of government bonds
and invests more in capital, which in turn leads to more output growth.
But for the shocks to the productivity, the mean growth rate of the economy
can increase or decrease depending on the values of 	 and other parameters.









In this case, an increase in the variance of the productivity shocks lowers the
growth rate. But when 	(1, /  has an ambiguous sign. Our results
con"rm the complicated pictures of the e!ects of stochastic shocks on output
growthinObstfeld(1994),Turnovsky (1995),and Grinolsand Turnovsky(1996).
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The "rst equation above tells us that the stochastic shock in government
expenditure will enhance the holding of risky capital. In the second equation the
e!ect of the stochastic shock in production on the holding of risky capital is
ambiguous.
We have derived the value function X(=,t) in Appendix B. Let =(0) denote
























K  , (35)
where c/= and n are determined as in Theorem 1. Taking di!erentiation in
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government expenditure and production are ambiguous.
5.2. Ewects of xscal policies
Now,we turn to how taxes on capital income and consumptionimpact on the
equilibrium.
First, di!erentiating all endogenous variables with respect to the tax on the
































If 	"1, c/= is independent of the tax rate, because in this case c/=",
which is independent of . When 0(	(1, we notice that a rise in the taxation
on the deterministic component of capital income has an ambiguous e!ect on







Therefore, a higher tax on the deterministic component of capital income will
increase the consumption}wealth ratio and decrease the economic growth rate.
This can be explained as follows: a higher tax on capital income will lower the
return on capital. As the agent switches away from capital to bonds and
consumption, this reduces capital accumulation, lowers the growth rate, and
increases the consumption}wealth ratio.
When 	'1, we still "nd that capital income taxation reduces the holding







But it reduces the consumption}wealth ratio: d(c/=)/d(0.
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These results are very similar to the ones for the tax on the deterministic


















From the analysisabove, therelationshipbetween incometaxesand growthis
similar to the one in Turnovsky (1995): Raising the tax rate on the stochastic
componentof capitalincomehas the opposite e!ect to raisingthetax rateon the
deterministic component of income.
Finally, we examine the e!ects of the consumption tax on the equilibrium.
Recall that from the Ramsey}Cass}Koopmans model, the consumption tax
does not a!ect the rate of economic growth and long-run capital accumulation.







That is to say, increasing the consumption tax will reduce the consump-
tion}wealth ratio because a higher consumption tax decreases private
consumption directly, and the agent has more money to invest in capital and
bonds, which in turn increases wealth. Therefore, the consumption}wealthratio
decreases as a result of a higher consumption tax.







Hence, /(0 when 	'1; and /'0 when 0(	(1. Because when
	'1, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is small, and the agent is less
willing to sacri"ce current consumption for future consumption. Therefore, the
cut in investment is more than the cut in current consumption, which leads to
a lower long-run growth rate. On the other hand, when the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is relatively large (i.e. 0(	(1), the agent is more
willing to give up current consumption for investment in risky capital. As
a result, a higher consumption tax leads to a higher growth rate.



















Therefore,X/(0 when 	'1. The explanationis simple. Sincethe elasticity
of intertemporal substitution is small, current consumption will not be severely
cut as a result of a consumption tax, whereas current investment in assets is
reduced. In the long run, the agent will accumulate less assets and earn less
income. His consumption and asset holdings are all reduced in the long run.
Since welfare is de"ned on both consumption and wealth accumulation, his
long-run welfare is also lower. For 	(1, the welfare e!ect of a consumption tax
is ambiguous because the direct e!ect of a higher consumption tax reduces
consumption.But with a larger elasticity of intertemporal substitution the agent
may increase his asset holdings, which in turn can lead to more asset accumula-
tion and more income. This rising income can give rise to more long-run
consumption. Again since the agent's welfare is de"ned on both consumption
and asset holdings, his welfare may also rise in this case.
6.E 4ects of the spirit of capitalism
In this section, we will discuss how the spirit of capitalism or the concern for
social status a!ects asset pricing and economic growth. For simplicity, we set
consumption tax, , to zero in this section.
First, we give the equilibrium asset}pricing relationships. Following
Turnovsky (1995), we de"ne the market portfolio as Q"n=#n=, and















































and using Proposition 4.1, we get the result. 
Again /(1!	!
)= can be regarded as the risk-free return. Eq. (42)
indicates that the returns on risky assets (government bonds and capital) are
given by the familiar consumption-based capital asset pricing model with r as
the return on the market portfolio.
Furthermore, if we de"ne the return on the market portfolio in the absence of
the spirit of capitalism as r, then, in our de"nition of the return of the market
portfolio r, we set 
"0. Hence,
r"(1!)#	( # ).























Eq. (43) implies that, with the spirit of capitalism, the gap between the returns on
risky assets and the return on the risk-free asset will be enlarged. Like Bakshi
and Chen (1996), our "ndings can be used to partially explain the equity
premium puzzle in Mehra and Prescott (1985).
For the growth rate, social welfare, and portfolio selection, we have















































































Similarly, if 	(1, we have 
(0. In this case 










Therefore, an increase in the spirit of capitalism will always increase the growth
rate and the holding share of risky capital. With a strong spirit of capitalism, the
agent cares more about his social status and the power of wealth, and will
accumulate more wealth and take more risk in investment in order to improve
his social status.









when 	'1 and 
'0. Furthermore, with the same condition on the tax rate on









when 	(1 and 
(0. Given the assumption on the tax rate, a strong spirit of
capitalism always reduces the consumption}wealth ratio. Since the agent's
utility is de"ned on both consumption and wealth accumulation, his long-run
welfare rises as a result of higher wealth and possibly even higher consumption.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have extended the existing frameworks of stochastic growth
and asset pricing by including the spirit of capitalism and concern for social
status * direct preferences for wealth. In this extended model, we have studied
how stochastic shocks in production and government spending a!ect consump-
tion, wealth accumulation, economic growth, and welfare. This paper has
further extended the studies by Eaton, Grinols, Obstfeld, and Turnovsky,
among others, to consider the impact of various taxes on the consumption}
wealth ratio, growth, and welfare. The existence of the positive e!ect of a con-
sumption tax on growth is a result of the spirit-of-capitalism or wealth-is-status
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output growth.
The direct e!ect of the spirit of capitalism on the economy has been also
explicitly considered in this paper. It is shown that the existence of the spirit of
capitalism can better explain the di!erence between the rates of return on
government bonds and risky stock * the Mehra}Prescott risk-premium puzzle.
In the spirit-of-capitalism or wealth-is-statusmodel, the gap between the returns
on risky assets and the risk-free asset is always larger. Furthermore, a higher
spirit of capitalism or a stronger concern for social status can lead to higher
output growth, more holdings of risky capital, and a lower consumption}wealth
ratio.
This research can be extended in many directions.The discussion of monetary
policy is a natural choicewhen wealthincludesbonds, capital,and real balances.
The results can be compared to the ones in Turnovsky (1995), Grinols (1996),
Turnovsky and Grinols (1996) where only real balances are included in the
utility function. Another interesting extension is to examine the optimal (wel-
fare-maximizing)choices of capital income taxes and consumptiontax following
Corsetti (1992, 1997), Turnovsky (1995), and Turnovsky and Grinols (1996).
Appendix A
















From Eq. (A.4), we have
 	"n  #n (1!) #2nn(1!). (A.5)
To solve the problem, we de"ne the value function <(=,t)
<(=,t)"eX(=,t)


















The Lagrangian function associated with the problem is
eu(c,=)#¸(eX(=,t))#e(1!n!n). (A.7)







These equations determine the optimal choices of c/=, n, n, and  as the











Now, we have completed the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Appendix B
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X(=,t)"=, (B.2)
where  is to be determined.
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